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 Federal Common Law versus Agency 
Power: 
An Essay on Epic Systems 
Corporation v. Lewis 
Daniel T. Deacon* 
This essay examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. 
Lewis1 from an administrative law perspective.  Epic Systems invoked the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s (FAA) guarantee that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract”2 to invalidate the National Labor Relations Board’s 
(NLRB) ruling that the use of class or collective-action waivers in certain employ-
ment contracts violated the federal labor laws.3  This essay argues that Epic Systems 
is part of a broader trend in which the Court has wrested control from administrative 
agencies under the banner of normal statutory interpretation.  But at least when it 
comes to the FAA, the Court is engaged in statutory interpretation in name only.  In 
fact, over the years, the Court has refashioned the FAA into a form of court-admin-
istered federal common law, in which the sparse terms of the FAA have been trans-
formed into “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”4 which 
sweeps much more broadly than the framers of the Act would have imagined. In 
doing so, the Court has increasingly used the FAA to engage in policymaking of its 
own, particularly when it comes to deciding whether otherwise neutral legal rules 
in fact discriminate against arbitration agreements by “interfer[ing] with fundamen-
tal attributes of arbitration.”5 
Once it is recognized that the FAA has become a species of federal common 
law,6 it becomes easier to understand why the Court erred in Epic Systems in finding 
that the NLRB could not use its interpretive authority under the labor laws to regu-
late the use of class-action waivers.  The Court is a generalist body administering, 
in the FAA, a trans-substantive statute.  That statute’s purpose is ultimately to place 
arbitration contracts “on an equal footing with other contracts.”7  Any contract that 
may otherwise be legal under federal or state law is subject to sectoral regulation 
by agencies acting within the scope of their authority.  By sealing off arbitration 
agreements in particular from federal regulatory authorities, the Court is in fact 
                                                          
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
 1. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 2. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). 
 3. See generally Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1612. 
 4. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 5. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
 6. I follow Thomas Merrill in defining federal common law as “any federal rule of decision that is 
not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text.” Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985). 
 7. AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 339. 
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privileging those agreements, not putting them on equal footing with other kinds of 
contracts.8 
Part I of this essay expands on these arguments in the context of Epic Systems.  
Part II places Epic Systems in the context of broader developments in administrative 
law.  These developments have seen the courts—and, in particular, certain judges 
and Justices—engage in statutory interpretation in order to defeat agency efforts at 
regulation.  Under the surface, however, the courts have in fact engaged in a kind 
of judicial policymaking of a form that often privileges private property, free ex-
change, and reducing regulatory compliance costs over the more diffuse public ben-
efits that may flow from regulation.  Part II illustrates this trend by examining Jus-
tice (then Judge) Kavanaugh’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in United 
States Telecom Association v. FCC.9 
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, FEDERAL COMMON LAW, AND 
AGENCY POWER 
A. The FAA as Federal Common Law 
The Federal Arbitration Act traces its roots to 1925.10  At the time of its enact-
ment, the framers of the Act intended to guarantee that federal courts would honor 
parties’ agreement that disputes between them be heard by private arbitral tribunals, 
as well as to prevent courts from adopting rules that discriminated against arbitra-
tion specifically.11  The scope of the Act was also considered limited in important 
ways.  Members of Congress shared an understanding that the Act only applied in 
federal, not state courts, and it did not displace state law regulating arbitration.12  
Congress also did not intend the FAA to cover employment agreements.13   In fact, 
“[i]n passing the FAA, Congress intended to allow arbitration for only a narrow set 
of legal claims: inter-merchant contract disputes sounding in breach and maritime 
claims.”14   Congress also envisioned the Act as applying to agreements between 
parties of roughly equal bargaining power.15  Congress did not intend the Act to 
apply to federal statutory claims as opposed to contractual ones.16 
Over time, each of these limitations has fallen away.17  The FAA now applies 
to all kinds of claims, with certain very narrow exceptions, whether brought in state 
or federal court.18  The FAA has been read to broadly preempt state rules affecting 
                                                          
 8. This argument builds on Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991 
(2017). 
 9. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 10. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, 
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2860 (2015). 
 11. See id. at 2860-61; see also David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 444-
45 (2011). 
 12. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal 
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 126-27 (2006); David S. 
Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23-25 (2004); Horton, supra note 11, at 445-46. 
 13. Horton, supra note 11, at 446. 
 14. Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 307 (2015). 
 15. Horton, supra note 11, at 447. 
 16. Leslie, supra note 14, at 307-08. 
 17. See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 8, at 999-1001. 
 18. Id. 
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arbitration agreements, erecting a near-ironclad rule that all procedural provisions 
contained within a contract, which also contain an arbitration clause, must be hon-
ored “according to their terms.”19  The judicial expansion of the FAA has led Justice 
O’Connor to claim that “the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining con-
gressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case 
by case, an edifice of its own creation.”20 
One might respond to the above by claiming that, in the recent cases, the Court 
is acting simply as a good textualist.  The FAA’s text does, after all, make arbitra-
tion agreements generally enforceable, and many of the above limits, besides the 
exclusion of employment agreements, do not appear plainly on the surface of the 
Act.  Textualism can only get the Court so far.  This is especially apparent when it 
comes to the FAA’s saving clause, which was central to Epic Systems.  That clause 
“permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable ‘upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”21  The Court has 
said that the clause does not operate to save contractual defenses that either target 
arbitration directly or that “interfere[] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.”22  
For example, in Concepcion, the Court dealt with a California unconscionability 
rule that, in certain circumstances, declared class waivers unenforceable, whether 
or not they were in a contract which contained an arbitration clause.  The Court held 
the rule was preempted by the FAA.  In doing so, the Court applied its own sense 
of arbitration’s “fundamental attributes” and, notwithstanding the fact that arbitral 
organizations had been actively developing their own rules for class arbitration, de-
clared those attributes inconsistent with class processes. 
Thus, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the FAA’s saving clause is a pow-
erful tool through which to assert the Court’s own power in the area, essentially 
allowing the Court to decide which generally applicable contractual rules conflict 
with the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration and which do not, guided only by a 
very general sense of what arbitration typically looks like, today or in 1925.  And 
the saving clause is not the only aspect of the FAA that allows the courts to exercise 
their own discretion.  Courts are also put in charge of deciding such amorphous 
questions as whether there is there is an “‘inherent conflict’ between arbitration” 
and another federal law’s “underlying purposes,”23 and whether certain procedural 
restrictions in arbitration agreements undermine the “effective vindication” of fed-
eral laws.24  Plainly, courts today exercise a large amount of discretion to decide 
whether certain rules should apply in the arbitration context.  And the courts, and 
the Supreme Court in particular, have generally decided that question one way; Ar-
bitration agreements should be enforced according to their terms.  But that conclu-
sion results not from a mechanical application of the text of the FAA and certainly 
not from the intent of the Act’s framers.  It has been, in large part, a choice made 
by the Supreme Court itself. 
                                                          
 19. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see also Leslie, supra note 14, at 312 
(“The Court has converted its judge-made presumption of arbitrability into a presumption of contract 
terms being enforceable as long as they are inserted into an arbitration clause.”). 
 20. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995); see also Resnik, supra 
note 10, at 112. 
 21. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 22. Id. at 344. 
 23. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 24. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 242 (2013). 
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B. Epic Systems and Agency Power 
Epic Systems, written by Justice Gorsuch, treated the question of whether the 
FAA prevented the NLRB from banning class waivers located in arbitration agree-
ments as a simple question of statutory interpretation.  “[A]s a matter of law the 
answer is clear,” the Court declared.  “Congress has instructed the federal courts to 
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms—including terms providing 
for individualized proceedings.”25  The FAA’s saving clause did not apply for the 
same reason given in Concepcion; Requiring class procedures would interfere with 
what the Court viewed as one of the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration.26  And 
because, according to the Court, this meant that the FAA could not otherwise ac-
commodate the NLRB’s ruling, that ruling must flow from a “clear and manifest 
congressional command to displace the Arbitration Act.”27  Nor could the NLRB 
take shelter under Chevron, which would normally allow the NLRB the power to 
interpret ambiguous provisions of the labor laws.  Not only did the “canon against 
reading conflicts into statutes” take the NLRB’s preferred interpretation off the ta-
ble, but, the Court declared, “[T]he Board hasn’t just sought to interpret its statute, 
the NLRA, in isolation: it has sought to interpret this statute in a way that limits the 
work of a second statute, the Arbitration Act.”28  Thus, one of the premises under-
girding Chevron—that Congress intends the agency to resolve ambiguities in the 
statutes it administers—was missing.29 
Here is not the place to critique the Court’s interpretation of the federal labor 
laws.  Rather, I want to step back and assess Epic Systems from a broader institu-
tional perspective.  The Court’s fundamental mistake was in failing to recognize the 
kind of statute that the FAA is.  The FAA is, at bottom, a statute that says a certain 
kind of contract is enforceable like any other contract.  It is a general statute.  That 
is, it applies regardless of the kind of transaction in question or parties involved.  
And it is administered by the courts in a way that, as I argued above, has allowed 
for judicial innovation over time and calls for judicial policy judgments at various 
critical junctures. 
Once the FAA is viewed in this way, it becomes easier to see why an agency 
should be able to interpret its statute in ways that restrict arbitration agreements or 
that interfere with arbitration’s “fundamental attributes.”  Agencies commonly reg-
ulate against a background of a more permissive, general legal regime.  Indeed, one 
might say that is their very purpose.  When the Environmental Protection Agency 
restricts emissions from coal-fired power plants, it is interfering with the preexisting 
legal entitlement of the owners of such plants to emit pollutants into the air as long 
as doing so does not create a nuisance under state tort law.  And when an agency 
says that a certain kind of contract is illegal, assuming it has the power to do so, that 
act is only meaningful because the background law would otherwise make it en-
forceable.  We allow agencies to depart from background law because they are per-
forming a specialized task, and their particular knowledge and experience with a 
given issue gives them special insight when determining whether exceptions should 
be made to otherwise lawful activity. 
                                                          
 25. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
 26. Id. at 1622. 
 27. Id. at 1624. 
 28. Id. at 1629. 
 29. Id. 
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The same dynamic exists when the two legal regimes in question both trace to 
federal statutes.30  Take the interaction of the federal antitrust laws, and the Sherman 
Act in particular, with the regulatory regime administered by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission under the Communications Act.  When the FCC has acted to 
enforce network neutrality, it has adopted what amounts to a per se ban on certain 
kinds of vertical contracts—for example, contracts that obligate Internet service 
providers to grant priority to network traffic associated with certain services.31  
Such contracts are treated very differently under the court-administered Sherman 
Act,32 where they are judged according to a rather permissive “rule of reason” in-
quiry, with the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate anticompetitive effect.33  But to 
my knowledge, no one (including opponents of net neutrality) has argued that the 
antitrust laws should bar the FCC from exercising its Chevron authority in order to 
regulate certain contracts more stringently than background antitrust law.  And the 
courts have upheld the FCC’s authority to do so with scarcely a mention of the 
Sherman Act.34 
In these examples, we can see clearly that agencies often act against the back-
drop of some other source of law, including federal law, that would otherwise treat 
the activity in question as legal.  Agencies in these situations normally have no 
obligation to bend over backwards in order to accommodate the more permissive 
legal regime—indeed, doing so would be in many cases antithetical to their mis-
sions.  So why should the FAA be any different?  The FAA says that a certain kind 
of contract is enforceable to the same extent that other kinds of contracts are.  As 
the dissent in Epic Systems pointed out, “[t]hrough the Arbitration Act, Congress 
sought ‘to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not 
more so.’”35  By erecting an impenetrable wall around the permissive legal regime 
established by the FAA and elaborated by the courts, the Epic Systems majority 
failed to appreciate the ways in which agency regulation commonly operates, and 
in doing so, it unduly privileged the federal common law over legitimate claims of 
regulatory power. 
II. THE GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATION BY COURT 
In this Part, I will argue that Epic Systems is part of a broader trend in which 
the courts have begun to use court-administered rules to trump the power of agen-
cies.  Although there are several possible examples of this trend, I will focus here 
on one (in addition to the use of the FAA): the growth of the “major questions” or 
                                                          
30 For a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between the FAA and other federal statutes that 
shares some similarities, but also has some differences, with the one offered here, see David L. Noll, 
Arbitration Conflicts, Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3186735. 
 31. See generally IN THE MATTER OF PROTECTING & PROMOTING THE OPEN INTERNET, 30 FCC RCD. 
5601 (2015). 
 32. On the Sherman Act as a body of court-administered federal common law, see, e.g., Margaret H. 
Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 405 (2008). 
 33. See Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, The Law and Economics of Network Neutrality, 45 
IND. L. REV. 767, 803 (2012). 
 34. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 35. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)). 
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“major rules” doctrine.  Using that doctrine, the Supreme Court and some lower 
courts have seized interpretive authority from administrative agencies and trans-
ferred it to the courts.  Although the courts say that they are doing so to honor the 
intent of Congress, the malleability of the major questions doctrine allows the courts 
significant discretion in its application, discretion that often amounts to a policy 
judgment concerning the substance of the agency rule in question. 
The major questions doctrine is an exception to Chevron’s command that 
courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations in cases of statutory ambiguity.  
Although the doctrine has antecedents going back several decades,36 I will focus on 
two recent applications: Chief Justice Roberts’ version of the doctrine in King v. 
Burwell and Justice Kavanaugh’s in the D.C. Circuit net neutrality appeal.  King 
concerned the availability of tax credits for individuals to buy health insurance in 
states that had not established insurance exchanges following enactment of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act (sometimes known as “Obamacare”).37  
The Internal Revenue Service answered that question in the affirmative.  Under 
normal deference principles that answer would stand, provided the statute was am-
biguous and the IRS’s interpretation reasonable.  But the Court held that normal 
deference principles didn’t apply.  It explained itself with only the following: 
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars 
in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of 
people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question 
of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to this statutory 
scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would 
have done so expressly.  It is especially unlikely that Congress would have dele-
gated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance 
policy of this sort.  This is not a case for the IRS.38 
Instead of deferring to the IRS’s views the Supreme Court interpreted the stat-
ute itself and determine its “correct reading,” without reference to the IRS’s view.  
In doing so, the Court in King found that the correct reading of the statute was in 
fact the one preferred by the agency.  But the Court was clear: It was for the courts, 
and not the IRS, to make that call. 
Two features of the King move are worthy of attention.  First, the explanation 
for why the question was a “major” one is left remarkably vague.  The only real 
explanation given is that the case involved a lot of money and affected a lot of 
people.  But that is true for many agency decisions.  Where is the line to be drawn?  
The Court has not said.  Second, the rationale for the doctrine is left similarly un-
clear.  King says that it is following Congress’s lead by presuming that Congress 
would not wish such major questions to be left to agency determination.  But the 
King majority failed to comprehend that the question is a comparative one; Would 
Congress rather prefer agencies or courts to resolve ambiguities, even when doing 
so would have “major” consequences?  As Cass Sunstein has argued, there are good 
reasons to think that the traditional justifications for allocating such decisions to 
agencies apply equally, or even more so, in the context of “major questions.”39 
                                                          
 36. For a history of the doctrine, see Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 
70 VAND. L. REV. 777 (2017). 
 37. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015). 
 38. Id. at 2489 (internal citations omitted). 
 39. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 243 (2006) (criticizing major ques-
tions exception in part because “expertise and accountability, the linchpins of Chevron’s legal fiction, 
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King thus allows courts to transfer interpretive authority away from agencies 
and toward themselves using a vague and malleable rubric for determining “major-
ness,” and without explanation for why doing so is faithful to Congress’s intent.  A 
slightly different version of the doctrine was deployed by Justice Kavanaugh in his 
dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in the D.C. Circuit’s recent net neutrality 
appeal.40  That appeal concerned the FCC’s decision to reclassify Internet service 
providers—companies such as Comcast and Verizon—as “telecommunications car-
riers” under the Communications Act.  That decision had the consequence of ap-
plying a set of “common carrier” obligations to such companies under Title II of 
the Act.  The D.C. Circuit panel upheld the FCC’s authority to do so; the Act was 
ambiguous regarding whether ISPs qualified as telecommunications carriers, and 
the FCC’s determination that they did so qualify was reasonable under Chevron.41 
Justice Kavanaugh would have granted the ISPs rehearing petition and held 
that the FCC did not have such authority.  He would have done so using a different 
version of the “major questions” doctrine, which he relabeled the “major rules” 
doctrine.  Under the “major rules” doctrine, Congress must “clearly authorize[]” 
“major rules.”42  That rule in essence flips the Chevron inquiry.  Instead of deter-
mining whether there is an ambiguity resolved by the agency in a reasonable way, 
the court must instead determine whether there is a clear indication that Congress 
intended the agency to act in this way.  When does that rule apply?  Justice Ka-
vanaugh states that it applies when “an agency wants to exercise expansive regula-
tory authority over some major social or economic activity.”43  Although conceding 
that “determining whether a rule constitutes a major rule sometimes has a bit of a 
‘know it when you see it’ quality,” Justice Kavanaugh would have found the rule in 
United States Telecom Association to be a “major” one because it applied common 
carrier regulations to ISPs, which had not been done before.44 
I have argued elsewhere that Justice Kavanaugh’s version of the “major rules” 
doctrine suffers from a hidden baseline problem.45  If whether ISPs qualify as “tel-
ecommunications carriers” is truly ambiguous, then it would seem that any answer 
to that question—yes or no—would have potentially “major” consequences.46  Af-
ter all, failures to regulate can also have significant costs.  What Justice Kavanaugh 
seemed to say was that rules that cause significant costs or other disruption to reg-
ulated entities must be clearly authorized by Congress.  But why is that a fair un-
derstanding of Congress’s intent?  Congress is presumably aware that lack of regu-
lation can also have negative consequences, and it has (by hypothesis) not supplied 
an answer of its own.  The “major rules” doctrine, at least as deployed by Justice 
Kavanaugh, thus appears to artificially disfavor pro-regulatory agency decisions.  
And because whether the “major rules” doctrine applies will, as Justice Kavanaugh 
conceded, often amount to an ad hoc judgment by the reviewing court. The doctrine 
                                                          
are highly relevant to the resolution of major questions; it follows that so long as the governing statute 
is ambiguous, such questions should be resolved by agencies, not by courts”). 
 40. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 41. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 42. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 418 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 43. Id. at 421. 
 44. Id. at 422-23. 
 45. See Daniel T. Deacon, Judge Kavanaugh and “Weaponized Administrative Law”, YALE J. ON REG. 
(July 11, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-kavanaugh-and-weaponized-administrative-law-by-dan-
iel-deacon/. 
 46. See id. 
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allows the courts significant discretion to curtail pro-regulatory agency decisions 
where the court concludes that the costs associated with the agency action are 
simply too high and seemingly without reference to any benefits that might be cap-
tured by the agency action. 
What does all this have to do with Epic Systems, the subject of this trio con-
tained in this Journal issue?  I believe that Epic Systems is part of a trend that is also 
reflected in the “major questions” cases.  The courts in these cases speak in the 
language of statutory interpretation.  They are all nominally about what Congress 
might intend or what it has commanded.  But in fact, the expansion of these doc-
trines reflects a privileging of the courts’ power, not Congress’s.  In each case, the 
Court reserves for itself significant discretionary power.  It wields that power—
often, though not always—to curtail agency efforts at regulation, even in situations 
where according to the otherwise generally applicable rules the agency’s word 
should prevail.  With the recent additions of Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh 
to the Supreme Court, we are likely to see a continuation of this trend.  Whether it 
eventually expands to the elimination of Chevron altogether is anyone’s guess. 
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